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CONFRONTING CLOSE CORPORATE STATUS IN WEST
VIRGINIA: ALTERNATIVE THEORIES TO PREVENT
ABUSE TO THE DETRIMENT OF CREDITORS.
WILLIAM E. GALEOTA*
I. INTRODUCTION
The close corporation is a widely used and accepted form of business
organization.1 Many business proprietors and partners have chosen the close
corporation as a vehicle for exercising maximum entrepreneurial freedom
and, at the same time, enjoying minimum liability exposure. Indeed, the prolif-
eration of small, closely-held corporations has likely been further encouraged
by other advantages in the modern business climate, such as favorable tax
treatment, investment facilitation, and even some popular perception that in-
corporation is synonymous with business success. All these potential advan-
tages, however, tend to create a false sense of unlimited freedom among close
corporation principals.
While larger, public corporations may be subject to popular criticism of
their lack of "corporate social responsibility" and a popular disdain for corpo-
rate "bigness,"2 close corporations present another different type of social re-
sponsibility concern. The misconceived notion that corporate status means no
personal liability, together with the functional and practical resemblance of
close corporations and partnerships or proprietorships, creates an enormous
potential for using corporate status to frustrate the legitimate claims of
creditors.
In some cases, the problem is resolved at the outset, either by safeguards
used by the person dealing with the close corporation,4 or by statutory pro-
* J.D. 1983, West Virginia University College of Law; Associate, Steptoe and Johnson,
Clarksburg, W. Va.
I1 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS (Callaghan) § 1.02 (1971 Cum. Supp. 1982). Of course, this
assumes a broad definition of a "close corporation" as one in which there are relatively few share-
holders. Some legal scholars would prefer the term be used more narrowly to designate only those
incorporated enterprises "in which the participants consider themselves partners, inter sese ...."
Id. For the purpose of this Note, the term will be used in the narrower sense, referring only to
those corporations which are functionally closely related to a partnership.
0Weck, Remedies for Abuses of Corporate Status, 9 WAKE FOREST. L. REv. 463 (1973).
Masinter v. Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1980).
Such safeguards might include, inter alia:
a) contracting for additional personal liability of the sole or principal shareholders,
1
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tection for certain creditors.5 We are concerned here, however, with those
cases in which a creditor or claimant has had either no opportunity or no
economic reason to use costly safeguards and is afforded no specific statutory
protection. Only after the creditor's claim or ability to collect is prejudiced in
some way does he realize that close corporate status is being used against
him.
Generally, the sole or principal shareholders of a close corporation have
relied on the traditional notions of corporate separateness and limited
liability6 to impair the ability of creditors to satisfy their claims. A simple
hypothetical helps illustrate the typical situation.
A is the principal shareholder of Fuel Brokers, Inc., a family-owned busi-
ness which deals in the procurement of long-term contracts for the purchase
and sale of coal. With or without direct fault on A's part, Fuel Brokers, Inc.
becomes severely burdened by its own obligations. These obligations may be
contracted-for debts, civil judgments, or even burdensome contract duties, to
name only a few. In any event, A realizes that everything Fuel Brokers, Inc.
has, as well as everything it may have in the foreseeable future, is subject to
these claims.
To negate this burden, A takes what he may believe are perfectly
legitimate steps to preserve his business, but which, nevertheless, prejudice
the rights of creditors. The methods fall into three basic categories:
1) In planning ahead, A initially organizes his business so that the corpo-
ration potentially liable for claims will have little or no assets with which to
satisfy them.
2) In response to or in contemplation of a claim against the corporation,
A effects a transfer of important assets to himself, a third person, or another
corporation.
3) To insulate future operations, A creates a "new" close corporation,
carrying on the profit-making activities of its predecessor but free of its
obligations.
This Note will focus on the situation where A takes one or all of these
steps and will discuss alternative theories with which to challenge them.
These theories, all based on well-recognized exceptions to traditional notions
of entrepreneurial freedom, are 1) the doctrine of "piercing the corporate
b) contracting for a security interest in collateral property of the corporation,
c) examining of corporate financial statements, records, and accounts, and
d) requiring performance or surety bonding.
' See, e.g., W. VA. CODE §§ 46-6-101 to 111 (1966) (Creditor listing and notice requirements of
"bulk transfer" article of U.C.C.).
' See infra text accompanying notes 10-13.
[Vol. 86
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veil," 2) the law of "fraudulent conveyances"8 and 3) the doctrine of "cor-
porate opportunity."9
Each theory is addressed individually because each was developed to ad-
dress a particular abuse. Nevertheless, courts have not always applied any of
them narrowly and substantial "overlap" has resulted. As will be seen, this
characteristic will enable a creditor using all of the arguments in the alterna-
tive to not only challenge almost any nature or type of activity to his detri-
ment, but also to reinforce the persuasiveness of his challenge with alterna-
tive applicable grounds for relief.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
A. Background and Explanation of the Doctrine
Corporation law has long been preoccupied with the idea of "limited lia-
bility" for shareholders."0 This idea is premised on the "separateness" of the
corporate entity, which makes it
a legal personality capable of making and executing contracts, possessing and
owning real and personal property in its own name, suing and being sued as a
person distinct from its owners, the shareholders, and carrying on business in
much the same manner as a natural person acting through agents of its own
selection."
This general rule has been broadly applied by the courts, even where all
the stock in a corporation is owned by one person'2 and where the corporate
structure is admittedly adopted for the sole purpose of avoiding personal
liability. 3 Naturally, such broad protection has led to cases in which courts
could not ignore the use of the corporate entity to defeat the very public
policy which had fostered its use.
See infra text accompanying notes 10-81.
See infra text accompanying notes 82-118.
o See infra text accompanying notes 119-38.
" 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATION § 25 (rev. perm. ed.
1974) [hereinafter cited as Fletcher].
" Id. at § 25. See also Sanders v. Roselawn Memorial Gardens, Inc., 152 W. Va. 91, 159 S.E.2d
784 (1968); Lowther v. Bridgeman, 57 W. Va. 306, 50 S.E. 410 (1905); Floyd v. National Loan & Inv.
Co., 49 W. Va. 327, 38 S.E. 653 (1901); Pyles v. Riverside Furniture Co., 30 W. Va. 123, 2 S.E. 909
(1887); Blue Jacket Consol-Copper Co. v. Scherr, 50 W. Va. 533, 40 S.E. 514 (1901).
" Southern States Coop., Inc. v. Dailey, 280 S.E.2d 821 (W. Va. 1981); De Stubner v. United
Carbon Co., 126 W. Va. 363, 28 S.E.2d 593 (1943); De Stubner v. Microid Process, Inc., 124 W. Va.
591, 21 S.E.2d 154 (1942); William C. Atwater & Co. v. Fall River Pocahontas Collieries Co., 119 W.
Va. 549, 195 S.E. 99 (1937); Fleming v. J. G. McCrory Co., 114 W. Va. 439, 174 S.E. 325 (1933). See
also Fletcher, supra note 10, at § 25.1; DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc., v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co.,
540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976).
"1 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 10, at§ 41.2; Barber,Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 371,373 (1981).
1983]
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Eventually, practically all authorities came to agree that under some cir-
cumstances in a particular case, the corporation may be disregarded as an en-
tity standing between its owners and their adverse parties. 14 The exception is
used to withhold the usually privileged attributes of limited liability and
legal personality where they would "produce unjust or undesirable conse-
quences inconsistent with the purpose of the concept." 5
The basic rationale, for application of what came to be known as the doc-
trine of "piercing the corporate veil," is found in the oft-cited case of United
States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co."8 Therein, the court found dis-
regard of the corporate entity appropriate "when the notion of legal entity is
used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend
crime,"" and the law will regard the organization as an "association of per-
sons" rather than a corporation.18 In West Virginia, this rationale has been
echoed as recently as 1980 in Jules, Inc. v. Boggs.9
B. Application of the Doctrine Generally
The most striking characteristic of cases addressing the piercing ques-
tion is their lack of guidance. In applying the doctrine, courts have tended to
merely point an accusing finger at the corporation and its owners and use
some appropriate metaphor to describe the arrangement and justify
disregard of the corporate entity." The noted authority, Professor Hamilton,
has described this technique as
inherently unsatisfactory since it merely states the conclusion and gives no
guide to the considerations that led a court to decide that a particular case
should be considered an exception to the general principle of non-liability. A
systematic analysis, moreover, is not readily discernible in the cases, and
many courts continue to rely on metaphors to explain their results."
" 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 10, at §§ 41-47. See also H. BALLENTINE, BALLENTINE ON CORPORA.
TIONS §§ 122-41 (rev. ed. 1946); H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS §§ 146-53 (2d ed. 1970); N. LATTIN,
THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 14 (2d ed. 1971; 1 H. OLECK, MODERN CORPORATION LAW §§ 10-12
(1958 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
,5 HENN, supra note 14, at § 146.
" 142 F. 247 (E. D. Wis. 1905).
,7 Id. at 255.
18 Id. See also Note, Corporations-Disregard of the Corporate Entity, 43 W. VA. L.Q. 141
(1936-37).
19 270 S.E.2d 679, 683 (W. Va. 1980) (quoting United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit
Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (E. D. Wis. 1905)). Jules presents an unusual application of the doctrine justify-
ing administrative denial of an application for a liquor license. See also infra note 65.
' Some typical examples of the metaphors used: mere adjunct, alias, alter ego, alter idem,
arm, blind, branch, buffer, cloak, coat, corporate double, instrumentality, mouthpiece, name,
nominal identity, phrase, puppet, screen, sham, simulacrum, snare, stooge, subterfuge, tool. See
Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEX. L. REV. 979 (1971).
"2 Id. at 979.
[Vol. 86
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What, then, should be the focus of an inquiry into the propriety of apply-
ing the general rule of the doctrine of piercing? The authorities take differing
approaches. Professor Hamilton, for example, suggests that analysis should
be directed not to the nature of corporateness but to the substantive policies
underlying the issues. In support of this position, he notes four general prin-
ciples that tend to appear whenever a corporate recognition problem is ad-
dressed. They are:
1) notions of simple justice and fairness,
2) a desire to retain reasonable procedures and avoid substantive tangles,
3) a desire to protect potential creditors and minority shareholders, and
4) a predilection to hold a shareholder to his election of corporateness.'
Another authority has suggested that the test being applied is, in reality,
that familiar animal "totality of circumstances. ' 'n By definition, it permits a
court to deal with each case on its own distinctive facts without providing
guidance for future application.24 This suggests that the courts are attempt-
= Id. at 1008-09.
Barber, supra note 13, at 374.
2 Id. In support of this conclusion, the Professor lists the following factors, one or more of
which has been present in each case where a court pierced the veil:
1) commingling of funds and other assets of the corporation with those of the share-
holders,
2) diversion of corporate funds or assets to noncorporate uses,
3) failure to maintain corporate formalities necessary for the issuance of stock,
4) individual shareholder's representations to a third party of personal liability for a
corporate obligation,
5) failure to maintain minutes or other corporate records,
6) identical equitable ownership of two entities,
7) identity of directors and officers responsible for supervision and management of two
entities,
8) failure to adequately capitalize for reasonable risks of the undertaking,
9) absence of separately held corporate assets,
10) use of the corporation as a shell or conduit for some particular aspect of the business
of an individual or another corporation,
11) sole ownership of all stock by one individual or family,
12) use of same office or business location by the corporation and shareholders as indi-
viduals,
13) employment of same attorney or other important employees by the corporation and
shareholders as individuals,
14) concealment or misrepresentation of identity of interests in the corporation and per-
sonal business activities of the shareholders as individuals,
15) disregard of legal formalities and failure to maintain an arm's length relationship
among related entities,
16) use of corporation to procure benefits for another person or entity,
17) diverson of corporate assets to the detriment of creditors, or manipulation to con-
centrate assets in one entity and liabilities in another,
1983]
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ing to balance the competing interests. On the one hand are the policies be-
hind insulating shareholders from personal liability and, on the other, the
policies justifying piercing.25
All this policy discussion, unfortunately, puts the analysis right back
where it started-the piercing doctrine is invoked whenever a court finds it
appropriate. However, at least four general theories may be discerned under
which most, if not all; of the decisions can be grouped. They are:
1) the failure of formalities theory,
2) the failure of fairness theory,2"
3) the agency theory, and
4) the enterprise entity theory.'
Of these, only the first three are popularly applied. The enterprise entity
theory is not frequently used (even where it might be) because it appears to
be appropriate in only a small number of situations. 9 Its particular impor-
tance however, in the circumstances contemplated by this Note, will be dis-
cussed below," along with the other more popular theories.
18) contracting by the corporation with intent to avoid risk of nonperformance, and
19) formation and use of a corporation to assume existing liabilities of another person or
entity.
Id. (citing Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 210 Cal. App. 2d 825, 26 Cal. Rptr. 806
(1962)).
Barber, supra note 13, at 375-76.
Id. at 376. This particular commentator lumps the first two theories together into a "two-
prong test" which was applied in Automotriz del Golfo de Cal. v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792, 306 P.2d
1 (1957). For analytical purposes, their distinction is important because some courts might find
either sufficient, standing alone.
' Barber, supra note 13, at 400. Agency might be an alternative category for those cases
which fall under the "alter ego" (or other synonymous metaphor) umbrella. This particular
authority would, however, group those cases under the "formalities" theory and group only those
cases relying on strict agency principles under the agency heading.
Professor Barber also provides an invaluable "laundry list" of guidelines and safeguards,
designed to help shareholders avoid the spectre of personal liability, under the categories of:
1) the "formalities" element,
2) the "fairness" prong and
3) the agency theory.
Id. at 402-03. Obviously, if a corporation's shareholders have heeded the warning contained
therein, the task of a potential creditor's counsel is made significantly more difficult.
Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 343 (1947).
The "enterprise entity" theory is derived from the decision in Taylor v. Standard Gas &
Elec. Corp. 306 U.S. 307 (1939) (known as the Deep Rock case). Simply stated, it applies where the
corporate entity does not correspond to the actual enterprise, but only to a fragment of it. In such
a case, the court may combine two or more corporations into an aggregate enterprise entity which
more accurately represents the business arrangements of the persons involved. Berle, supra note
28, at 348.
11 See infra text accompanying notes 67-76.
[Vol. 86
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C. Problems in Application of the Doctrine
1. Failure of the courts to recognize the distinction between tort and
contract claims
In light of the varying consideration given to innumerable factors by the
courts, it is surprising to find an almost total disregard for whether the
creditor's claim sounds in tort or contract, before courts consider which fac-
tors weigh most heavily against, or in favor of, piercing. Some commentators
urge, and this writer agrees, that there is an obvious and important distinc-
tion between the two types of cases."'
For example, consider the effect of factors under the "formalities" theory,
such as maintenance of corporate meeting minutes, issuance of stock and use
of the same business location by the corporation and its shareholders. The de-
fenders of the corporate entity can persuasively argue that a creditor with a
claim arising out of a contract normally has a prior opportunity to determine
the validity of the corporate status. Therefore, the argument continues, the
creditor should be estopped from denying either the existence or the
separateness of the corporation.2
With tort claims, the persuasiveness of the distinction goes the other
way, benefitting the creditor. There, a prior opportunity to determine corpo-
rate status rarely exists, so it would be illogical to require the tort creditor
to show a failure of formalities to justify piercing.'
Nevertheless, courts have failed to use this important distinction to give
practical meaning to their analytical approach. Properly, the distinction
should be used to focus the court's attention on factors which really make a
difference in the relationship between the parties, even before those factors
are considered.
2. Disproprotionate weight given to individual factors in the piercing
analysis
One difficulty in using the "totality of circumstances" test described
above,34 or any other analysis to predict the disposition of a potential piercing
21 Barber, supra note 13, at 380-86. See also Comment, Alternate Methods of Piercing the
Corporate Veil in Contract and Tort Cases, 48 B.U.L. REV. 123 (1968); Hamilton, supra note 19, at
984.
2 "[W]here a party knows of the relationship between a corporation and its stockholder and
chooses freely and voluntarily to deal or contract with them in their respective capacities, he is
estopped to claim that the individual stockholder is the alter ego of the corporation or vice versa."
1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 10, at § 47 (citing Slover v. Winston, 155 Va. 971, 157 S.E. 150 (1931)).
1 Barber, supra note 13, at 381. Conversely, if the creditor asserts failed formalities as
justification for piercing, the defendant can use the creditor's inability to investigate in advance
and absence of reliance to rebut.
" See supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
1983]
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situation, is that courts give varying weight to factors considered in making
their decisions. Although a reasoned synthesis of these cases is impossible,
one can readily perceive a tendency by the courts to focus on certain factors
as being more persuasive than others. Hopefully, by recognizing the dispro-
portionate individual influence of some of these factors, an attorney may
more easily and accurately make his evaluation of the strengths and weak-
nesses of his client's case.
a. Inadequate Capitalization. In any case involving the issue of piercing,
capitalization of the corporation is an important factor. The essence of any re-
quest for piercing is that a judgment against the corporation would be uncol-
lectable, which implies insufficient capital.
In considering adequacy of capitalization, we begin with the general rule
that capital must be sufficient to cover the reasonably foreseeable risks of
the business. 5 The two most popular approaches used in this analysis are: 1)
the financial analysis approach-comparing capitalization of companies in the
same industry; 6 and 2) the insurance approach-requiring policy limits to
cover actuarially projected, reasonably anticipated losses."7
Whichever test is used, many courts have failed to establish in their anal-
ysis exactly when capitalization will be considered. In fact, most have merely
assumed, without considering, that capitalization is to be considered at the
time of corporate formation.' The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, however,
has applied a much more practical analysis. In De Witt Truck Brokers Inc. v.
W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co.," that court reasoned that the "obligation to pro-
vide adequate capital begins with incorporation and is a continuing obligation
thereafter- during the corporation's operations." 0
This ongoing consideration of the level of capitalization makes inherent
good sense when one considers the interests at stake. A potential creditor is
not concerned with the incorporators' efforts to adequately capitalize. In-
deed, capitalization at incorporation may be totally irrelevant to the issue of
the corporation's ability to meet its obligations when they arise.
Whether emphasized or not, capitalization should be only one factor in
3 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 10, at § 44.1.
1 Barber, supra note 13, at 392. This information is normally available in such publications as
Moody's Manual of Investments, Standard & Poor's Corporation Records, and Dunn &
Bradstreet, Inc Reports for nearly all industries.
' Barber, supra note 13, at 394. The insurance industry has compiled data on what "rea-
sonably anticipated losses" might be for many major industries. Compliance with these projec-
tions would be evidence of adequate capitalization.
Hamilton, supra note 20, at 986; 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 10, at § 44.1.
540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976) (South Carolina case).
40 Id. at 686. See also Dix, Adequate Risk Capital: The Consideration for the Benefits of
Separate Incorporation, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 478, 494 (1958).
[Vol. 86
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any consideration of a piercing question. The same Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which liberally and practically applied its analysis on the capitaliza-
tion issue, has also explicitly held that it is only one factor and "[t]he conclu-
sion to disregard the corporate entity may not ... rest on a single factor . . . .,,
Nevertheless, inadequate capitalization remains one of the most emphasized
points and one which merits special attention when addressing the piercing
question.
4 1
b. Failure to follow corporate formalities. This important factor normally
lurks in the background when courts are describing corporations metaphorical-
ly as the "alter ego" or "instrumentality" of a person." Its basic premise is,
simply stated-if an organization is going to be a corporation, it ought to act
like one.4
While many courts treat formalities as just one consideration in the pier-
cing analysis, it is often made up of several individual factors, all tending
toward the conclusion that the shareholders themselves have disregarded
the corporate entity.
45
For the creditor or other proponent of piercing, an examination of a close
corporation's operations with formalities in mind may be a revelation. Almost
any corporation is, at one time or another, in non-compliance with some tech-
nical requirements and the likelihood of non-compliance tends to increase as
the size of the corporation decreases. Thus, for uninitiated shareholders, cor-
porate formalities may create a trap.46 This trap, however, cannot be boldly
relied upon by the would-be piercer. Courts will likely be willing to listen to
41 540 F.2d at 687. Since the undercapitalization in some degree is almost always present in
piercing cases (or the creditor would not be trying to pierce), courts should avoid overemphasizing
it as a factor.
"z See Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349 (1944); Iron City Sand & Gravel Div. of McDonough
Corp. v. West Fork Towing Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1091 (N.D. W. Va. 1969), rev'd on other grounds,
440 F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1971).
"s See supra note 20, for a list of other metaphors sometimes used when following the same
line of analysis.
" This theory has become so well recognized as to be referred to by some writers as "the
doctrine of alter ego." 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 10, at § 41.1. See also Tynes v. Shore, 117 W. Va.
355, 185 S.E. 845 (1936).
" A helpful list of the factors which create a substantial risk that the court will also ignore
the corporate entity has been compiled. Some of these are:
1) incorporating without issuance of shares of stock,
2) shareholders; or director's meetings infrequently or never held,
3) decisions made by shareholders as if partners,
4) shareholders or officers do not sharply distinguish personal and corporate property,
5) corporate funds used to pay personal expenses and vice versa, without proper accoun-
ting, and
6) complete corporate and financial records are not maintained.
See Hamilton, supra note 20, at 990.
'" Id. at 991.
1983]
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explanations for failure to comply with technical rules and, in the case of
close corporations, there is a good explanation. Shareholders of a close corpo-
ration "often find managing the business a full-time occupation; formal corpo-
rate affairs [tend to be] put off or ignored because there is full agreement in
fact by all interested parties ... .""I In any event, when the final tally is made
under a "totality of circumstances"4 analysis, these factors tend to pile up
quickly on the side favoring piercing.
A notable feature of the "alter ego" or "instrumentality" theory is that it
is theoretically applicable whether the "person" behind the corporate veil is
an individual or another corporation. 9 The theoretical qualification is re-
quired because courts tend to view situations involving parent-subsidiary,
brother-sister, or other conglomerate arrangements with much less sym-
pathetic restraint than they have for one-man corporations, even if the doc-
trine itself does not."0 Courts are probably more willing to pierce the cor-
porate veil when the principal is a corporation rather than an individual,
simply on consequences alone, because another corporation will be held liable
for the pierced corporation's obligations. Where the principal is an individual,
however, piercing imposes personal liability on non-business assets.51
Therefore, counsel on either side of the piercing issue may want to conscious-
ly consider and explain to the court the consequences, adverse of favorable,
of piercing. Like the distinction between tort and contract cases, 2 it may help
focus the court's attention on which factors to look for as the circumstances
unfold.
c. Presence of fraud. Because prevention of fraud is one of the generally
accepted justifications for piercing,' circumstances which indicate its
presence weigh heavily in any analysis, The type of fraud contemplated in
piercing, however, is obviously something less than actual fraud, in the legal
sense.' Instead, the term has been used whenever there is any evidence of in-
tent to defraud, bad faith or a mere showing that injustice may result.5 As
Professor Barber suggests, "fraud" in piercing cases would be more appropri-
47 1&.
" See supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
4' Hamilton, supra note 20, at 991.
See generally Berle, supra note 28.
5' Hamilton, supra note 20, at 983, 992. Many cases dealing with the "alter ego" theory phrase
the test in terms of agency. Obviously, if a court finds that a corporation is, in fact, the "agent" of
another, liability follows, To refer to application of "agency" law as "piercing" in these cases is "both
unnecessary and confusing." Id. at 983,
See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
See supra note 19.
54 1 W. FLETCHIER, supra note 10, at § 44,
Iron City Sand & Gravel Div. of McDonough Corp. v. West Fork, Towing Corp., 298 F. Supp.
1091 (N.D. W, Va. 1969) rev'd on other grounds, 440 F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1971); Associated Vendors Inc.
v. Oakland Meat Co., 210 Cal. App. 2d 825, 838, 26 Cal Rptr. 806, 813 (1962).
[Vol. 86
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ately called "unfairness. '"" Unfortunately, most case law has failed to recog-
nize that a somewhat lower standard may be applied."
Equally problematic is the tendency of courts to consider fraud in their
analysis without considering the distinction between the piercing doctrine
and the law of fraudulent conveyances. In those cases where a creditor's
rights are prejudiced by some change in the ownership of the corporation's
assets, the distinction gives the creditor an alternative theory of recovery
which, depending upon the circumstances, may be more specifically ap-
plicable to the problem."
D. Particular Applicability of the Doctrine to Close Corporation Problems
By nature, close corporations tend to resemble other business organiza-
tions with few members. Functionally, close corporations have characteris-
tics which tend to foster recognition problems and recognition is the founda-
tion of corporate separateness. Whenever "piercing" is employed, that
recognition is judicially refused. It is not surprising, then, to find that deci-
sional law treating the "piercing" question contains few, if any, cases in
which the shareholders of a corporation with stock publicly-traded or widely-
held were held personally liable on corporate obligations.59
Moreover, public policy and the objective underlying corporate existence
also dictate against the use of "piercing" against a public corporation." One
commentator has suggested that piercing the corporate veil of a large corpo-
ration would amount to "burning down the house in order to roast the pig in
it.""1 Thus, the doctrine is not only applicable to close corporations, it may be
exclusively applicable.
Where an unsecured creditor faces efforts to use the corporate entity
against him, piercing may be the sharpest and truest arrow in the quiver.
Creditors are the very object of one of the doctrine's protective purposes and
" Barber, supra note 13, at 377.
" See, e.g., Kap-Tex, Inc. v. Romans, 136 W. Va. 489, 67 S.E.2d 847 (1951); DeStubner v.
United Carbon Co., 126 W. Va. 363, 28 S.E.2d 593 (1943); William C. Atwater & Co. v. Fall River
Pocahontas Callieries Co., 119 W. Va. 549, 195 S.E. 99 (1937); Southern Coop. Foundry Co. v.
Warlick Furniture Co., 117 W. Va. 336, 185 S.E. 773 (1936). See also 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 10,
at § 44.
See infra text accompanying notes 83-119.
See supra text accompanying note 1.
' Barber, supra note 13, at 372. But see Berle, supra note 28, in which the "enterprise entity"
theory is presented as applicable to "large businesses" as well.
01 Oleck, supra note 2, at 484. The comment in text was made in the context of a discussion of
possible sanctions for socially irresponsible corporate conduct. Of course, this is only true because
public corporations sustain numerous diverse interests. Creditors may be advised to consider that
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its most frequent proponents. Any indication that recognition of the cor-
porate entity will "delay, hinder, and defraud creditors," 2 will be a factor in
the court's analysis. The particular advantage of using "piercing," however,
lies in two additional characteristics which are not immediately apparent.
1. Flexibility-The "Enterprise Entity" Theory
As previously mentioned, the piercing doctrine has been analyzed with so
many factors considered that its application can be described as a "totality of
circumstances" test.' Although this makes predictability difficult, 4 the other
side of the coin is flexibility. The importance of flexibility becomes even
more readily apparent when one considers the myriad forms which corporate
recognition problems may take.
Obviously, every corporation is going to be different, just as its members'
objectives, methods and even personalities are different from those in other
corporations. It follows, then, that the particular conduct or structure of a
corporation, which operates to invoke the doctrine, will be equally difficult to
pinpoint. Nevertheless, the doctrine has been applied in cases involving
totally unrelated problems, from corporate insolvency'5 to corporate reputa-
tion.66 Taken literally, the broad statement of proper circumstances for ap-
plication of the rule 7 leaves only the bounds of legal imagination as a con-
straint on its use.
One particular approach, which demonstrates how malleable the doctrine
can be, is Professor Berle's "enterprise entity" theory." Whereas the gener-
ally conceived situation giving rise to piercing involves just one corporation,
the "enterprise entity" theory focuses on the overall business purpose of the
"persons" controlling it. It is designed to permit a court to declare an overall
business enterprise to be the real entity behind one or more corporations and
make the entire operation responsible for the obligation of any of its compo-
Southern Coop. Foundry Co. v. Warlick Furniture Co., 117 W. Va. 336, 342, 185 S.E. 773,
776 (1936). See also 1 W. FLTCHER, supra note 10, at § 44.
's See supra text accompanying notes 20-30.
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
5 See, e.g., DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Fleming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir.
1976).
1 See Jules, Inc. v. Boggs, 270 S.E.2d 679 (W. Va. 1980) in which the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals used the doctrine to approve an inquiry into the reputation and character of cor-
porate officers and stockholders by the State's Alcoholic Beverage Control Commissioner in his
decision not to grant the corporation a private club liquor license.
" "[W]hen the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, pro-
tect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an association of persons." I&L
at 683 (quoting United States v. MIilwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (E. D. Wis.
1905)).
Berle, supra note 28.
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nent members. This type of analysis allows a court to address those situa-
tions where one corporation may itself satisfy the requirements of recogni-
tion, but the interrelationship of two or more corporations is being used to
subvert public policy.69 While "piercing" obviously can apply whether the
"person" behind the corporation is an individual or another corporation, the
analysis has historically been under the "alter ego" or "instrumentality"
theory. ° That approach is inherently limited by a "two-entity" focus and a
particular concern with how the dual relationship might have misled those
who dealt with either.
The ."enterprise entity" theory, on the other hand, is more broadly con-
cerned with maintaining a perceived public policy in having corporate organi-
zation correspond with the entire business operation.7' Thus, it can be applied
to modern day commercial situations in which a single business is conducted
by a "constellation of corporations."72 The distinction, is that where
"piercing" is normally urged to tear down the corporate entity, the "enter-
prise entity" theory can be used to actually erect a new entity (in a sense, a
de facto corporation) 3 "with a body of assets to which liabilities are assigned
more nearly in accord with the ascertainable fact of the enterprise and its re-
lationship to outsiders."'"
A creditor who finds that a corporation he has dealt with is part of such a
fragmented enterprise is, of course, confronting a corporate structure which
was probably in place at the time his claim arose. Therefore, he will be hard-
pressed to argue that it is a "new" corporation, being used to keep assets be-
yond his reach. That, however, is the attractiveness of the "piercing" doc-
trine generally; it permits a creditor to argue for "piercing" without relying
on activity after his claim arose. The premise of the argument allows the
piercing proponent to direct a court's attention to corporate structure as well
as corporate conduct,75 which may be very persuasive in certain instances.
Consider, for example, the typical situation where an entrepreneur de-
cides on a corporate structure which isolates high-risk activity in one corpo-
ration and valuable assets in another. Although this arrangement may seem
particularly reprehensible to those with public policy and social responsibil-
" Id. at 352-53.
7' See supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
B' Eerle, supra note 28, at 345.
72 Id. at 343.
3 Id. at 345.
7 Id. at 349.
11 With application of any theory in a "piercing" case, arguments must be tailored to the
facts. There will be few situations where the "enterprise entity" theory, or any other, is the only
theory. Any attempt to categorize a case as particularly appropriate for the application of any one
theory would, obviously, narrow the court's equitable perception and limit the persuasiveness of a
"totality of the circumstances" argument.
19831
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ity perspectives," common understanding of modern commercial dealingscompels the conclusion that such arrangements do, in fact, exist."
In this situation, the aggrieved party can use more conventional piercing
arguments and the "enterprise entity" theory to fix liability on other corpo-
rations involved in the same overall business of the individual, as well as on
the individual himself. The choice to use either or both would depend, of
course, on where there were assets available to satisfy the claim.
As an important corollary, the individual contemplating such a corporate
arrangement, before or after an obligation arises, finds himself under a much
more onerous personal threat. If he decides to use multiple corporations at
the outset, or a "new" corporation to continue his business after its predeces-
sor has incurred some crippling obligation, he may find that not only those
assets held by all the corporations involved but also his own personal assets
are at stake. An individual behind two corporations is certainly no more
secure than his less inventive colleagues who do business through only one.
2. Fiduciary Duty of Close Corporation Managers
A long-recognized principle, in any type of corporation, is that dominant
or controlling shareholders, directors and officers owe a fiduciary duty to the
corporation.78 In close corporations, however, this fiduciary duty of the mana-
gers has been found to extend not only to the corporation and its share-
holders, but also to creditors of the corporation.
In Pepper v. Litton,79 the United States Supreme Court held that a domi-
nant or controlling shareholder will be held to "the fiduciary standards of
conduct which he owes the corporation, its stockholder, and creditors."8 The
Court went on to explain that "[h]e cannot use his power for his personal ad-
vantage and to the detriment of the stockholders and creditors no matter
76 See Hamilton, supra note 20, at 1003. See also Automotriz del Golfo de Cal. v. Resnick, 47
Cal. 2d 792, 306 P.2d 1 (1957); Holland v. Joy Candy Mfg. Corp., 14 fll. App. 2d 531, 145 N.E.2d 101
(1957).
' Members of close corporations naturally want to take as much advantage of the corporate
structure as possible. When their members see their more sophisticated publicly-held corporate
cousins taking advantage of diversification, subsidiary, and holding company arrangements (to
name only a few), imitation in the close setting naturally follows. While some may not be ready to
contend that such arrangements are acceptable even in a larger public corporation, see Oleck,
supra note 2, they are particularly objectionable in smaller close corporations where there are
simply fewer assets to go around.
78 Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919) (dominant or controlling shareholders);
Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587 (1875) (directors); Bayliss v. Rood, 424 F.2d 142 (4th Cir.
1970); Meadows v. Bradshaw-Diehl Co., 139 W. Va. 569, 81 S.E.2d 63 (1954); Young v. Columbia Oil
Co., 110 W. Va. 364, 158 S.E. 678 (1931); Hope v. Valley City Salt Co., 25 W. Va. 789 (1885).
308 U.S. 295 (1939).
Id. at 311 (emphasis added).
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how absolute in terms that power may be and no matter how meticulous he is
to satisfy technical requirements."'"
To the aggrieved creditor, the existence of this duty and the implications
that come with it are amazingly helpful. Not only are the problems of showing
non-compliance with corporate formalities and other particular proof prob-
lems eliminated, but the burden of proof is entirely shifted to the defendant.
More significantly, the standard is not merely proof that the transaction or
circumstances were legitimate or reasonable. Instead, the fiduciary relation-
ship means that the dominant shareholder's dealings with the corporation
will be the subject of "rigorous scrutiny" and he must "not only prove the
good faith of the transaction, but also ... the inherent fairness from the view-
point of the corporation and all those interested therein.
8 2
By pointing out this important, heightened standard in close corpora-
tions, a creditor may be able to create a shift in a c6urt's perception of the
circumstances from the outset. Instead of waiting for the piercing proponent
to pile up factors which support piercing, the court, in a challenge of close
corporate status, should require the defendant to show why piercing is not
justified. The advantage to the piercing proponent of such a shift is obvious.
Establishing the existence of the situation giving rise to a fiduciary duty
becomes the threshold of the piercing analysis and the inherent fairness of
the situation, if established by the defendant, can be rebutted by factors nor-
mally used to justify piercing affirmatively. While this situation may not
always be present, its potential should always be considered in the close cor-
poration situation.
III. THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
A. Distinction from the "'Piercing" Doctrine
As discussed earlier, fraud occupies a special niche in the hearts of courts
invoking the piercing doctrine.' Some courts have suggested that the corpo-
rate veil should be pierced only upon a showing of fraud, actual or construc-
tive.84 Others have invoked the piercing doctrine when the activity complained
11 Id. "[T]hat standard of fiduciary obligation is designed for the protection of the entire com-
munity of interests in the corporation-creditors as well as stockholders." Id. at 307.
82 Id. at 306. The court in Pepper carefully noted that it was dealing with a bankrupt cor-
poration and a creditor's claim being asserted by the trustee. At least one lower court has viewed
this as a limitation on the holding. See In re Fussell, 15 Bankr. Rep. 1016, 1020 (W. D. Va. 1981).
This limitation, however appropriate in the bankruptcy context, should not be read to preclude a
court's consideration of the duty, generally. Surely, any duty which creates an enforceable right in
a bankruptcy trustee when breached by the dominant shareholder, must logically create some
right or interest in the creditors to whom it was owed prior to bankruptcy.
See supra text accompanying notes 52-57.
Iron City Sand & Gravel Div. of McDonough Corp. v. West Fork Towing Corp., 298 F.
Supp. 1091 (N.D. W. Va. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 440 F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1971). See also
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of involved a transfer of assets, which the law of fraudulent conveyances quite
adequately addresses. 5
All this suggests that the courts or, more likely, counsel for the piercing
proponents may have overlooked an important alternative ground upon
which transfers to the hindrance of corporate creditors may be set aside. In
those frequent instances where the factors gathered to support piercing in-
clude a transfer of assets, that particular transaction may be attacked
without regard to the corporate entity's existence or recognition. Since the
ultimate goal is satisfaction of obligations and not imposition of liability, the
law of fraudulent conveyances may be the better tool with which to pursue
that goal. Much like piercing, it can stand alone to achieve the desired result.
In concert with piercing, it can be tailored to fit the particular facts of more
varied situations which work to prejudice creditors' rights.
B. Statutory Basis
One important distinction between the piercing doctrine and the law of
fraudulent conveyances is that the latter has a statutory basis." While "pierc-
ing" is judge-made doctrine, fraudulent conveyances law in West Virginia is
embodied in a statute with notable historical origins." It is based on the com-
mon law which developed under an English statute" and, in its current form,
provides:
[e]very gift, conveyance, assignment or transfer of, or charge upon, any estate,
real or personal, every suit commenced, or decree, judgment, or execution suf-
fered or obtained, and every bond or other writing given, with intent to delay,
hinder, or defraud creditors, purchasers, or other persons, of or from what
they are or may be lawfully entitled to, shall as to such creditors, purchasers,
or other persons, their representatives or assigns, be void."
Although the principle has been given statutory authority the statute
has long been recognized as merely declarative of the common law." This link
with judge-made authority is important in that the statute addresses only
Rockford Equip. Co. v. J. R. Simplot Co., 92 Idaho 218, 440 P.2d 338 (1968); Herman v. Mobile
Homes Corp., 317 Mich. 233, 23 N.W.2d 757 (1947); Donnally v. Hearndon, 41 W. Va. 519, 23 S.E.
646 (1896).
See, e.g., Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215 (1941); National Car-
loading Corp. v. Astro Van Lines, 593 F.2d 559 (4th Cir. 1979); Southern Coop. Foundry Co. v.
Warlick Furniture Co., 117 W. Va. 336, 185 S.E. 773 (1936).
" See Note, The Law of Fraudulent Conveyances in West Virginia, 43 W. VA. L. Q. 266
(1937).
" W. VA. CODE §§ 40-1-1 to -16 (1982) are entitled "Acts Void As to Creditors and Purchasers."
Stat. 13 Ely., ch. 5 (1570) (emphasis added). See generally 1 G. GLENN. FRAUDULENT CON-
VEYANCES AND PREFERENCES §§ 58-62 (rev. ed. 1940).
W. VA. CODE § 40-1-1 (1982) (emphasis added). This provision has existed in its present form
in West Virginia since 1933.
Hutchison v. Kelly, 40 Va. (1 Rob.) 123 (1842); Hunters v. Waite, 44 Va. (3 Gratt.) 26 (1846).
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transfers made with "intent to delay, hinder or defraud."'" Since proof of par-
ticular intent must be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the trans-
fer,92 colarts began to develop a list of circumstances indicative of intent to
defraud. From the first known attempt to list these circumstances9 3 until
modern times,9" they have been referred to as "badges" or "indicia" of fraud.99
C. Application of the Statute
When all the indicia or badges of fraud are considered, the test tradi-
tionally applied by the courts is whether a reasonable man would conclude
that the conveyance was made with an intent to hinder, delay or defraud.96
Much like the "totality of circumstances" test applied when the doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil is used,9 7 the task of the creditor challenging a
91 W. VA. CODE § 40-1-1 (1982). See also 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1570).
Miller v. Gillespie, 54 W. Va. 450, 46 S.E. 451 (1903); Sturm v. Chalfant, 38 W. Va. 248, 18
S.E. 451 (1893); Hunter's Ex'rs v. Hunter, 10 W. Va. 321 (1877).
11 Twyne's Case, 3 Coke 806, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (1601). There the justices in Star Chamber
noted the following badges of fraud:
1) the gift was "general,"
2) the donor continued in possession,
3) it was made in secret,
4) it was made "pending the writ,"
5) there was "a trust between the parties," and
6) the deed recited "that the gift was made honestly, truly and bona fide."
76 Eng. Rep. at 812-14.
", See, e.g., Patterson v. Patterson, 277 S.E.2d 709 (W. Va. 1981), in which the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals found the following indicia of fraud:
1) gross inadequacy of consideration,
2) retention of possession or control by grantor,
3) pursuit of the grantor by his creditors by the time of the transaction, and
4) transfer of property to relatives pending litigation.
Id. at 718. See also Mullens v. Frazer, 134 W. Va. 409, 59 S.E.2d 694 (1950); Miller v. Correll, 97 W.
Va. 215, 124 S.E. 683 (1924); Citizen's Bank v. Wilfong, 66 W. Va. 470, 66 S.E. 636 (1909); Wood v.
Harmison, 41 W. Va. 376, 23 S.E. 560 (1895).
" For a thorough historical analysis of "badges of fraud," see Note, supra note 85.
W Patterson, 277 S.E.2d at 718; see also Miller v. Gillespie, 54 W. Va. 450, 46 S.E. 451 (1903);
Sturm v. Chalfant, 38 W. Va. 248, 18 S.E. 451 (1893); Hunter's Ex'rs v. Hunter, 10 W. Va. 321
(1877).
Nearly every American jurisdiction has a fraudulent conveyance law. Most of these have a
statute like West Virginia's, based on the common law and old English statutes. In twenty-three
states, however, legislatures have adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, drafted in
1919 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The Uniform Act car-
ries the ostensibly objective (reasonable man) test of the common law one step further. It rejects
the possibility of intent as a matter of law, adopting purely objective standards instead. These in-
clude conveyances by an insolvent without fair consideration, UNIF. FRAUD. CONVEY. ACT § 4
(1919), and conveyances made with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud. Id. at § 7 (emphasis
added). A detailed analysis of the act is beyond the scope of this Note.
" See supra text accompanying notes 22-24. See also Temple v. Jones, Son & Co., 179 Va.
286, 19 S.E.2d 57 (1942).
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fraudulent conveyance is essentially one of marshalling factors. Courts may
differ on where the test is satisfied, but they seem to agree that the more in-
dicia or badges of fraud the proponent can prove, the more likely relief will
be provided.
D. Designed to Protect Creditors
A basic premise of fraudulent conveyance law is that a debtor is legally
obligated to devote his property to satisfy his creditors' demands. 8 In West
Virginia, any creditor who has been injured by a fraudulent deed may assert
the statute99 and have the transfer, whatever its nature, set aside.' By the
language of the statute, the transfer of "any estate, real or personal"'1 1 is
covered, making applicability a rare point of issue.
One unique additional feature of West Virginia's statute is its applicabili-
ty to transfers or charges by insolvent debtors creating preferences. 2 The
contrary majority rule, excepting preferences, is based on common law rea-
soning that a preference, as such, is not a fraudulent conveyance and that a
debtor, though insolvent, could convey his property and prefer any one cred-
itor over others,"3 so long as there was no fraudulent intent. As of 1895, West
Virginia took its present statutory position that, where the debtor is insol-
vent, special rules should apply.' Interestingly, although the preference por-
tion of the statute does not mention fraud or intent to defraud, cases have in-
dicated that a creditor attacking a transfer as an unlawful preference must
still prove fraud.'0 5
Another variation of the statute which protects creditors is the invalida-
tion of "voluntary conveyances."'"" This section, however, creates rights only
in creditors whose claims existed at the time of the voluntary conveyance.
Without regard to the debtor's intent, the "voluntary" portion of the statute
" Clarke v. Friggins, 27 W. Va. 663 (1886).
Charter v. Maxwell, 132 W. Va. 282, 52 S.E,2d 752 (1949); Carr v. Davis, 64 W. Va. 522, 63
S.E. 326 (1908).
" The particular form of the conveyance is immaterial since "the statute embraces all trans-
fers of property where the intent is to harm creditors in enforcing their claims." Note, supra note
85, at 267. See also Humphrey v. Spencer, 36 W. Va. 11, 14 S.E. 410 (1892); Kanawha Valley Bank
v. Wilson, 25 W. Va. 242 (1884).
'o' W. VA. CODE § 40-1-1 (1982).
102 Id. at § 40-1-5.
10 Wolf v. McGugin, 37 W. Va. 552, 16 S.E. 797 (1893); Jackson v. Kittle, 34 W. Va. 207, 12
S.E. 484 (1890). See also Smith v. Whitman, 39 N.J. 397, 189 A.2d 15 (1963).
'u Note, supra note 85, at 287.
"' Warren Ref. & Chem. Co. v. Dyer, 101 W. Va. 452, 132 S.E. 877 (1926); Bankers' Pocahon-
tas Coal Co. v. Flanagan Coal Co., 100 W. Va. 707, 131 S.E. 545 (1926).
'W W. VA. CODE § 40-1-3 (1982) ("every transfer or charge which is not upon consideration
deemed valuable in law").
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permits only prior creditors to attack the conveyance as void."7 Subsequent
creditors may only impeach a voluntary conveyance by proceeding under the
primary theory of the statute"8 and showing fraudulent intent."9
Thus, the law of fraudulent conveyances gives creditors three alter-
natives, with certain conditions, with which to pursue a debtor; fraudulent
transfers, preferences, and voluntary conveyances are all within its scope.
There is, however, no distinction as to which type of debtor may be the sub-
ject of this pursuit, so the analysis can be separated from any attack on the
corporate entity. This is particularly important with close corporations since
assets are frequently transferred back and forth between them and their
members.
Creditors aggrieved by a debtor's transfer will usually find some type of
relief available under the broad scope of fraudulent conveyances, even if only
an opportunity to show that some manifestations of "unfairness" exist. 10 In
this way, an unsuccessful attempt to avoid the transfer under a fraudulent
conveyance theory may, nevertheless, help the court conclude that the close
corporation/grantor should not be recognized as a separate entity and that
"piercing" is, therefore, an appropriate alternative remedy.
E. Possibility of Tort Liability for Fraudulent Conveyances
In addition to a statutory attack on a transfer designed to hinder
creditors, there is some authority to support a common-law tort cause of ac-
tion on similar facts. This additional theory would be important in any situa-
tion where the creditor could prove damages not redressed by setting aside
the fraudulent transfer.'
A tort action based on fraud and deceit is analogous to a statutory
fraudulent conveyance attack in that both are premised on an injury to the
plaintiff's interest in property. An actual fraud upon creditors naturally oc-
curs whenever there is an intention to prevent them from recovering just
debts by an act which places the property of the debtor beyond their reach.1 2
Moreover, fraud has been broadly defined to include "all acts, omissions, and
10 Id See also Greer v. O'Brien, 36 W. Va. 277, 15 S.E. 74 (1892).
W. VA. CODE § 40-1-1 (1982).
" F.S. Corson Co. v. Hartman, 144 W. Va. 790, 111 S.E.2d 346 (1959); Bankhead v. Baughman,
115 W. Va. 483, 176 S.E. 854 (1934); Lockhand v. Beckley, 10 W. Va. 87 (1877). For a discussion of
the distinction between a prior and a subsequent creditor, see Peale v. Grossman, 70 W. Va. 1, 73
S.E. 46 (1911).
110 See supra text accompanying notes 52-57.
" Generally, the remedy provided upon proof of a fraudulent conveyance is limited to set-
ting it aside. See Patterson v. Patterson, 277 S.E.2d 709 (W. Va. 1981).
"I Burt v. Timmons, 29 W. Va. 441, 2 S.E. 780 (1887). See also Hulings v. Hulings Lumber
Co., 38 W. Va. 351, 185 S.E. 620 (1893).
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concealments which involve a breach of legal duty, trust or confidence justly
reposed, and which are injurious to another, or by which undue and uncon-
scientious advantage is taken of another." ' Constructive fraud is arguably
broad enough to include a transfer to conceal assets because it constitutes "a
breach of a legal or equitable duty, which, irrespective of moral guilt of the
actor, the law declares fraudulent, because of its tendency to deceive others,
to violate public or private confidence, or to injure public interests."'
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has recently demonstrated
its willingness to make this type of analogy and inject fraud and deceit prin-
ciples into cases traditionally based on the same underlying concerns."' Thus,
in those situations where the statutory remedy provides inadequate relief to
a creditor (for example where costs, expenses, and losses additional to the
original obligation are incurred as a consequence of the fraudulent transfer),
West Virginia courts should be receptive to this analogy on the basic idea
that the plantiff is entitled to be compensated for actual losses."' Where cir-
cumstances support the argument, exemplary (punitive) damages might also
be appropriate to punish the defendant and deter others from engaging in
the same type of conduct against public policy. 17
In the diverse factual situations contemplated by this Note, there may be
more or less persuasive grounds for tort liability, depending upon how much
interest the creditor has in the property actually transferred. Where, for ex-
ample, the creditor has obtained a judgment against the debtor (which consti-
tutes a lien against all the debtor's real property within the state"') the
creditor has a recognized property interest in that real estate. A subsequent
fraudulent transfer of real estate by the debtor may expose him and his con-
spirators to liability for improperly interfering with the execution of a judg-
" Stanley v. Sewell Coal Co., 285 S.E.2d 679, 682 (W. Va. 1982). See also Dickel v. Smith, 38
W. Va. 635, 18 S.E. 721 (1893).
.1. Stanley, 285 S.E.2d at 683 (citing Miller v. Huntington & Ohio Bridge Co., 123 W. Va. 320,
15 S.E.2d 687 (1941)).
115 Stanley, 285 S.E.2d at 683. The court found that an action for retaliatory discharge (a tort
in West Virginia) was "sufficiently related to an action for fraud and deceit" that a statute pro-
viding for "survival" of a cause of action for fraud and deceit also applied to a retaliatory
discharge action. Id. See also W. VA. CODE §§ 55-2-12, 55-7-8a (1981).
"I See Yates v. Crozer Coal & Coke Co., 76 W. Va. 50, 84 S.E. 626 (1915); Talbott v. West
Virginia C. & P. Ry., 42 W. Va. 560, 26 S.E. 311 (1896).
117 Leach v. Biscayne Oil & Gas Co., 289 S.E.2d 197 (W. Va. 1982); Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co,,
283 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1981). This writer admits some reservation on the possibility that the
courts would invoke public policy as justification for exemplary damages, especially where proof
of malice or willful wanton misconduct would be difficult to prove and the injury complained of is
hindrance of creditor's rights. This would certainly be an uncharacteristic situation for any court
to find appropriate for additional sanctions against the defendant. Cf Mandolidis v. Elkins Ind.,
246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978), which discusses appropriate circumstances for imposition of punitive
damages.
"' W. VA. CODE § 38-3-6 (1966).
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ment."19 Where that interference causes the creditor to incur costs and ex-
penses of pursuing the property, loss of use or rents, or any damage to the
property, it should be recoverable.
In arguing this tort theory, counsel must consider the particular cir-
cumstances and tailor alternative grounds. Any creditor can argue that he
has a property interest in seeing any one piece of property remain in the
hands of the debtor for ultimate satisfaction of the debt. The more certain
and identifiable that interest, however, the more likely it will be protected.
IV. THE DOCTRINE OF CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY
A. Explanation of the Doctrine
In a narrow category of cases, directors, officers, or controlling share-
holders of a close corporation have been held liable on the theory that certain
business opportunities of the corporation may not be usurped to benefit indi-
vidual personal interests. This theory is commonly known as the corporate
opportunity doctrine."'
There are two particular situations where this doctrine may be utilized
by creditors to protect their ability to have their claim against a close corpo-
ration satisfied. The first is where an individual or group of individuals was
already doing business through more than one business organization when
the creditor's claim arose. 2' Typically, the close corporation is only one of
several or is related, usually by common ownership or control, to a partner-
ship or proprietorship. In this situation, the controlling members routinely
decide which business opportunities will be allocated to which entity in the
overall business.'2
Alternatively, the dominant or controlling members may have been using
only one close corporation to pursue a particular business activity but, after
the creditor's claim arises, that business begins to "expand" into other exist-
ing or newly-created business organizations. In either case, the creditor is
faced with the possibility that the close corporation he had dealt with will
have its revenue-generating capacity impaired by allocation of its business
activities to other organizations.
119 See, e.g., James v. Powell, 25 A.D.2d 1, 266 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1966), involving an attempt to
execute judgment on the property of one Adam Clayton Powell who had conveyed away his pro-
perty to frustrate that execution. See also Comment, Creditor's Rights-Tort Liability for
Fraudulent Conveyance, 68 W. VA. L. REV. 416 (1966).
"1 3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 861.1 (rev. ed. 1975).
See also Comment, The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine, 18 Sw. L.J. 96 (1964); Note, Liability of
Directors for Taking Corporate Opportunities, Using Corporate Facilities, or Engaging in a Com-
peting Business, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 219 (1939).
11 See Berle, supra, note 28 for a discussion of the "enterprise entity" theory.
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The leading case on the corporate opportunity doctrine is Guth v. Loft,"'3
which stated the rule that:
if there is presented to a corporate officer or director a business opportunity
which the corporation is financially able to undertake, is, from its nature, in
the line of the corporation's business and is of practical advantage to it, is one
in which the corporation has an interest or reasonable expectancy, and, by em-
bracing the opportunity the self-interest of the officer or director will be
brought into conflict with that of his corporation, the law will not permit him
to seize the opportunity for himself."2
In determining whether a particular business activity constitutes a cor-
porate opportunity, at least three tests have developed, including:
1) the "expectancy test"-limiting "opportunities" to those situations in
which the corporation has an existing interest or expectancy or where a cor-
poration's purpose is frustrated by individual interference;
2) the "line of business test"-limiting the definition to situations where
an insider engages in business closely associated with existing or prospective
activities of the corporation, and
3) the "fairness test"-applying ethical standards of fairness to the
facts."=
These tests have, most recently, been applied with a preference for the
"fairness" approach or some variation on the same theme. This is appropriate
because the very premise of the doctrine is the fiduciary relationship of
directors and officers to the corporation, which calls into play notions of good
faith, trust and fair dealing.2
B. Remedy Provided by the Doctrine
The general rule in applying the doctrine is that, if usurpation by the in-
sider is proven, the opportunity and its proceeds will be held as a constructive
trust for the benefit of the corporation."= This is exactly the relief an aggrieved
creditor needs to protect his interest. The revenues or profits generated
through the activity can be identified in the hands of the receiving entity and
called upon to satisfy the creditor's claim. Where the business is service
oriented and has few tangible assets, this remedy appears extremely attrac-
23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
12 Id. at 272-73, 5 A.2d at 510-11.
2 Miller v. Miller, 222 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1974); Comment, supra note 120, at 97-98.
12 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Young v. Columbia Oil Co., 110 W. Va. 364, 158 S.E.
678 (1931); Sweeney v. Grape Sugar Ref. Co., 30 W. Va. 443, 4 S.E. 431 (1887). See also 3 W. FLET.
CHER, supra note 120 at § 863.
17 Guth v. Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939). Tierney v. United Pocahontas
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tive.1"' It addresses the situation where assets are insufficient or unavailable,
making it a viable alternative to the law of fraudulent conveyances. By focus-
ing on the fiduciary duties of officers, directors and controlling share-
holders" to the corporation, it also reinforces and supplements an argument
for "piercing the corporate veil."
C. Problems in Assertion of the Doctrine by Creditors
In the situations addressed by this Note, a substantial hurdle stands be-
tween a creditor and successful use of the doctrine. Traditionally, the cause
of action under the doctrine has been narrowly granted under circumstances
which may make its use by creditors difficult. The close corporation situation,
however, lends itself to exceptions which help broaden the otherwise limited
application.
1. Cause of action is the corporation's
From its inception, the doctrine has been asserted primarily by persons
with identifiable interests in the corporation, such as stockholders (through a
derivative action) or, occasionally, directors and officers. 3 ' The defendant in
such a case might argue, quite persuasively, that a mere creditor of the cor-
poration has only an inchoate interest, at best, in the corporation's on-going
business activities. Such an interest would be insufficient to justify interfer-
ence with otherwise valid business judgments, under normal circumstances.
This argument, however, pales considerably when the position of the
creditor of a close corporation is being addressed. A creditor, while not as di-
rectly interested in the corporation as a shareholder, is, nevertheless, an ob-
ject of the fiduciary duty imposed upon directors and officers. 3' In a close
corporation, the controlling members have an even greater fiduciary obliga-
tion; they must prove the good faith and inherent fairness of any challenged
transaction "from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested
therein."'32 As a practical matter, when a close corporation is being managed
by its sole shareholder, there may be no one better situated to assert the cor-
poration's rights than a creditor.
"' Where the business is labor or service intensive (e.g., the coal brokerage hypothetical),
this theory would be much more useful than where the business is capital intensive (e.g., manufac-
turing).
1' By virtue of his strategic corporate position, a controlling stockholder in a close corpora-
tion is in the same fiduciary relationship to the corporation and its creditors as directors and of-
ficers. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); See Comment, supra note 120, at 113.
'" See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 222 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1974) (shareholder's derivative action);
Young v. Columbia Oil Co., 110 W. Va. 364, 158 S.E. 678 (1931) (minority stockholders); Tierney v.
United Pocahontas Coal Co., 85 W. Va. 545, 102 S.E. 249 (1920) (minority stockholders).
"I In re Parsons Lumber & Planing Mill Co., 218 F. 674, 677 (N.D. W. Va. 1914); Rathbone v.
Parkersburg Gas Co., 31 W. Va. 798, 804, 8 S.E. 570, 573 (1888).
1,3 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) (emphasis added); see also Geddes v. Anaconda
Copper Mine Co., 254 U.S. 590, 599 (1921).
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Usurpation of a corporate opportunity can be compared to any other type
of mismanagement, official misconduct or waste of assets because it works to
the detriment of the corporation. When that detriment is a factor in the in-
solvency of a corporation, the creditor's interest becomes even more critical.
Thus, in insolvency, the creditor's rights are asserted collectively by the
receiver or trustee. These include any cause of action which the corporation
itself may have against its managers for breach of their duties."n
This is especially true in West Virginia where a long line of cases stands
for the proposition that managers of an insolvent corporation are bascially
trustees, holding the corporation's property for the benefit of all the cred-
itors."4 These cases seem to indicate that a creditor's standing to challenge
managerial decisions detrimental to the corporation improves as the corpora-
tion's financial position deteriorates until, finally, the creditor is given at
least a qualified right to assert what would otherwise be the corporation's
rights. Thus, it follows that the utility of the corporate opportunity doctrine
may be at its highest when the financial position of the corporation is at its
lowest. One other factor, however, prohibits this conclusion.
2. Financial inability of the corporation as a defense
A basic issue in any assertion of the corporate opportunity doctrine is the
ability of the corporation to avail itself of the opportunity. A business oppor-
tunity cannot be a "corporate opportunity" when the corporation, because of
insolvency, legal restrictions or any other factor, would not be able to act
upon the opportunity." Therefore, if a creditor waits too long to attempt to
assert the rights of the corporation, he may find that the hurdle of a lack of
standing to assert the doctrine is replaced by the defense of corporate inabili-
ty. Since the date for consideration of the inability defense is the date on
which the opportunity was appropriated, it appears that the later it occurs in
the corporation's downhill financial slide, the more applicable the defense
becomes.
There is authority, however, for the opposite view, that financial inability
of the corporation is no defense to usurpation of a corporate opportunity.3
That line of authority rests heavily on the fiduciary responsibility of the man-
agers. The reasoning is that if such conduct were justified on the theory of fi-
nancial inability of the corporation, there would be a temptation for the man-
.. See, e.g., Besselieu v. Brown, 177 N.C. 65, 97 S.E. 743 (1919).
1-3 E.g., Lilly v. Ernst, 113 F. Supp. 178 (S.D. W. Va. 1952); Ohio Fin. Co. v. Mannington Win-
dow Glass Co., 86 W. Va. 322, 103 S.E. 333 (1920); Ruffner v. Welton Coal & Salt Co., 36 W. Va.
244, 15 S.E. 48 (1892).
1" Young v. Columbia Oil Co., 110 W. Va. 364, 158 S.E. 678 (1931). See also 3 W. FLETCHER,
supra note 120, at § 862.1.
'" Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 709, reh'g
denied, 294 U.S. 733 (1935); W. H. Elliott & Sons Co. v. Gotthardt, 305 F.2d 544 (1st Cir. 1962).
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agers to refrain from using their best efforts on behalf of the corporation,
since its inability opens up an avenue of personal profit for them.137 This
authority also recognizes that financial inability and insolvency are not
synonymous. Insolvency implies that the business's assets are insufficient to
meet existing obligations and at least some of the manager's decision-making
powers have been nullified. Financial inability, on the other hand, might be
nothing more than inadequate resources, or lack of access to the resources
that would be required, to pursue a new business venture. Where insolvency
connotes actual inability, financial inability may be merely a matter of
business judgment.
The corporate opportunity doctrine is an uncharacteristic theory for at-
tacking a scheme to defeat the interests of creditors. In applying it to the
facts of any one situation, special consideration must be given to creditor
standing and financial inability hurdles. Where it does apply, however, it is
entirely consistent with, and complements, an argument for "piercing the cor-
porate veil," because it is determined on the objective facts and circum-
stances at the time the opportunity arose." Likewise, in situations where the
potential injury to a creditor is diminished corporate revenues as well as a
transfer of assets, the doctrine nicely supplements the law of fraudulent con-
veyances. One court has specifically held that where the officers and directors
of a corporation form a new corporation whose purpose and line of business is
close to that of the former corporation, equity, under the proper circum-
stances will impose a constructive trust for the benefit of the former, on the
theory of misappropriation of corporate opportunity."9
V. CONCLUSION
For an unsecured creditor, the task of pursuing satisfaction of its claim
through a maze of corporate structures or transactions can be formidable.
Likewise, the wide diversity of methods in which corporate status may be
manipulated to the detriment of creditors makes it nearly impossible to for-
mulate a "canned" challenge. Nevertheless, since the foregoing theories have
developed in light of these differing circumstances, each can be tailored to
take advantage of factors weighing in the creditor's favor. Used together,
they can be more persuasive than any one alone. Yet, each has its own special
situations for application and effectiveness.
The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is an appropriate considera-
tion anytime the validity of corporate separateness is unclear. In close corpo-
rations, the inherent similarities with unincorporated business organizations,
' Irving Trust, 73 F.2d at 124.
I Borden v. Sinskey, 530 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1976); Morad v. Coupounas, 361 So. 2d 6 (Ala.
1978); Schreiber v. Bryan, 396 A.2d 512 (Del. Ch. 1978).
"' Morad v. Coupounas, 361 So. 2d 6 (Ala. 1978) (emphasis added).
1983]
25
Galeota: Confronting Close Corporate Status in West Virginia: Alternative
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1983
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
and the inevitable tendency to function as such, make it even more applica-
ble. Especially in a jurisdiction which recognizes the fiduciary duties in the
close corporate setting, the doctrine can be effectively used to fix liability on
either individuals or related corporations hiding behind the corporate veil.
The law of fraudulent conveyances, as compared to the doctrine of pierc-
ing the corporate veil, can be utilized anytime a transfer of assets is involved
without regard to the identity of transferor and transferee. In those situa-
tions where piercing applies, it effectively reinforces the challenge as a back-
up argument. Even if the piercing attack fails, the conveyance of valuable
assets can be unwound, providing the same favorable result.
As an added benefit, the piercing doctrine and fraudulent conveyance law
are linked by fiduciary relationships and are sensitive to any evidence of
fraud. Therefore, they complement each other by strengthening the other's
persuasive appeal. Although distinctively different, they are premised on the
same underlying concern with fairness to creditors.
The doctrine of corporate opportunity, while much less frequently
asserted, fits nicely into the reliance on fiduciary relationships and closes an
important gap. Where business opportunities have been diverted away from
the close corporation, a creditor may find it much more productive than other
theories. Despite its limited availability for use by creditors against corpora-
tions generally, the special situation of close corporations appears to be par-
ticularly appropriate for its use. Again, the exaggerated fiduciary element in
close corporations and the underlying concern with fairness to creditors but-
tress its applicability.
All three theories are particularly dependent on the "totality of the cir-
cumstances." While each is designed to address a certain abuse, any factual
situation may be appropriate for the assertion of any combination of them.
Thus, they should be pleaded alternatively and concurrently, with careful
concern for distinction and reinforcement rather than confusion of each with
the others.
Although all the factors to be considered are discussed in the case law,
this precedent discloses certain "more persuasive" factors, such as breach of
fiduciary duty or fraud, in any review of the totality of the circumstances. By
focusing on those factors which weigh heavily in favor of all three alternative
challenges, the implementation of any of them is made more palatable to the
courts.
By casting the challenges against the background of fairness and public
policy on which corporate existence is based, the propriety and likelihood of
creditor relief is enhanced. Whether one of the theories discussed in this
Note or some other is utilized, fairness and equity will always weigh heavily
in favor of creditor relief whenever a close corporation's actions or structure
offend the very public policy which justifies its existence.
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